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Abstract
Since Leibniz’s time, Cartesian mental causation has been criticized for violating
the conservation of energy and momentum. (Non-epiphenomenalist property dualism is
analogous.) Many dualist responses clearly fail. But conservation laws have important
neglected features generally undermining the objection. Conservation is local, holding
first not for the universe, but for everywhere separately. The energy (or momentum,
etc.) in any volume changes only due to what flows through the boundaries (no tele-
portation). Constant total energy holds if the global summing-up of local conservation
laws converges; it probably doesn’t in reality. Energy (momentum) conservation holds
if there is symmetry, the sameness of the laws over time (space). Thus, if there are
time-places where symmetries fail due to nonphysical influence, conservation laws fail
there and then, while holding elsewhere, such as refrigerators and stars. Noether’s con-
verse first theorem shows that conservation laws imply symmetries. Thus conservation
trivially nearly entails the causal closure of the physical. But expecting conservation
to hold in the brain (without looking) simply assumes the falsehood of Cartesianism.
Hence Leibniz’s objection begs the question.
Empirical neuroscience is another matter. So is Einstein’s General Relativity: far
from providing a loophole, General Relativity makes mental causation harder.
Contents
1 Introduction 2
∗Forthcoming at Philosophia
1
2 Extant Dualist Responses 5
2.1 Incorrect Dualist Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2 More Interesting Dualist Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3 The Brain-Free Argument 9
4 Overview of Conservation Laws 11
4.1 Locality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.2 Conditionality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.3 Noether Converse: Conservation Implies Symmetry . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.4 From Conservation to a Form of Causal Closure; But So What? . . . . . 15
4.5 Gentle Failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5 Averill and Keating’s Neglected Work 17
6 Example; Mental Force without Mental Energy 18
7 Minds and Space? 20
8 Conditionality, II 22
9 Locality, II 25
10 Not Begging the Question: Neuroscience? 28
11 Conclusion 30
12 Acknowledgments 30
Keywords: conservation laws, Noether’s theorems, philosophy of mind, dualism,
Cartesianism, interactionism, gravitational energy
1 Introduction
The energy conservation objection to nonphysical mental causation has been made
from the 1690s (Leibniz, 1997) to the 2010s. According to Leibniz’s Theodicy,
. . . two important truths on this subject have been discovered since M.
Descartes’ day. The first is that the quantity of absolute force which is in
fact conserved is different from the quantity of movement, as I have demon-
strated elsewhere. The second discovery is that the same direction is still
conserved in all bodies together that are assumed as interacting, in whatever
way they come into collision. If this rule had been known to M. Descartes,
he would have taken the direction of bodies to be as independent of the
soul as their force; and I believe that that would have led direct [sic] to the
Hypothesis of Pre-established Harmony, whither these same rules have led
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me. For apart from the fact that the physical influence of one of these sub-
stances on the other is inexplicable, I recognized that without a complete
derangement of the laws of Nature the soul could not act physically upon
the body. (Leibniz, 1985, p. 156)
To paraphrase, Descartes’s volume × speed quantity is not conserved, but momentum
(mass times velocity, including direction) is conserved, so the soul’s deflecting matter
while leaving its speed unchanged violates the newer notion of conservation. Being a
rationalist, Leibniz had high aesthetic standards for physics and metaphysics. While
co-inventing calculus, Leibniz did not inherit (as we do) an expectation that physical
laws would come as differential equations that generically cannot be solved exactly.
Hence what he counted as a “complete derangement” might not be nearly so disturbing
nowadays. From Leibniz till the mid-18th century, this issue was intimately bound up
with the vis viva controversy, which was roughly a disagreement about whether there
ought to be a conservation of energy law. (Laudan, 1968; Smith, 2006). The debate
about conservation and the soul engaged Knutzen, Crusius, Kant, Maxwell, Helmholtz,
Broad, and others.
This concern continues to influence discussions in the contemporary philosophy of
mind, often with an expectation of a quick and decisive victory over dualism. Many
contemporary philosophers of mind invoke the conservation of energy against interac-
tionist dualism (Bunge, 1980, p. 17) (Morowitz, 1987) (Pollock, 1989, p. 19) (Flanagan,
1991, p. 21) (Dennett, 1991, pp. 34, 35) (Fodor, 1998, p. 64) (McGinn, 1999, p. 92)
(van Inwagen, 2002, p. 196) (Searle, 2004, p. 42) (Lycan, 2011) (Westphal, 2016, pp.
41-44) (Schweizer, 2019) (and more in lists in ((Montero, 2006; Collins, 2008; Gibb,
2010))). Dennett expresses the objection as follows:
It is this principle of the conservation of energy that accounts for the physi-
cal impossibility of “perpetual motion machines,” and the same principle is
apparently violated by dualism. This confrontation between quite standard
physics and dualism has been endlessly discussed since Descartes’s own day,
and is widely regarded as the inescapable and fatal flaw of dualism. (Den-
nett, 1991, p. 35)
Even dualist E. J. Lowe thought that conservation laws might be problematic for
interactionist dualism. Lowe proposed several ways out, one of which (though not
his favorite) has merit (Lowe, 1992) (Lowe, 1996, pp. 56-61) (Lowe, 2003, pp. 138,
139). This 20th-21st century debate of course continues a discussion with important
18th and 19th century contributions (Watkins, 1995; Watkins, 1998; van Strien, 2015;
Heidelberger, 2003); a future work will survey the history normatively in more detail
[suppressed for blind review review].
Bunge has feared that physics and much else would collapse if dualism were true.
Dualism violates conservation of energy. If immaterial mind could move
matter, then it would create energy; and if matter were to act on imma-
terial mind, then energy would disappear. In either case energy—a prop-
erty of all—and only concrete things would fail to be conserved. And so
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physics, chemistry, biology, and economics would collapse. Faced with a
choice between these “hard” sciences and primitive superstition, we opt for
the former. (Bunge, 1980, p. 17)
Why body-to-soul causation should make energy disappear is quite unclear (Rosen-
thal, 1998) (Shaffer, 1968, p. 66) (Russell, 1927, p. 157). Immaterial souls (or non-
redundantly causally efficacious dualist mental properties) are not physical, after all,
so why must affecting them take energy? Soul-to-body causation, on the other hand,
certainly should violate the conservation laws; this all but follows from Noether’s first
theorem, which derives conservation laws from symmetries and which has a converse.
However, it is doubtful that even a Sith lord or Sauron could make physics, chem-
istry, biology and economics collapse with mental force; why else would they bother
with armies with blasters or swords? The property of gentle failure (below) addresses
Bunge’s concerns. In any case, if perchance it were to be found empirically that imma-
terial souls really do act on bodies, perhaps 21st century neuroscience might encounter
some bumps, but no other discipline would be much affected. Physicists and engineers
routinely study systems with external influences, such as the driven harmonic oscillator
(Marion and Thornton, 1988), without encountering any generic pathology.
As various authors have noted, non-epiphenomenalist forms of property dualism
suffer from analogous worries about how the mental can affect the physical (Crane,
2001, pp. 40, 43, 50) (Searle, 2004, pp. 44-46) (Zimmerman, 2007; Lycan, 2013).
Nondualist views have quite different problems with mental causation (Gibb et al.,
2013). Because having some problem with mental causation is common, and property
dualism (if not epiphenomenalist) can have the same kind of problem that interactionist
substance dualism has long had, the status of the energy conservation objection is of
more than historical interest (whether or not one takes substance dualism to be an
option today). For brevity and in view of the widespread traditional opinion that
interactionism is the most plausible form of dualism, interactionist dualism (whether
of substance or property) will henceforth be called “dualism.”
The plan of this paper is as follows. I will survey extant views on this longstanding
objection. A formalizationwill be attempted of the argument that objectors seem to en-
visage. A survey a variety of features of conservation laws that are frequently neglected
in the philosophy of mind follows. (Typically the physics employed in the conservation
discussion is that covered in high school chemistry and corresponds roughly the physics
of the 1860s or earlier.) Especially but not only because of conditionality, it emerges
that this longstanding (1690s-2010s) objection begs the question. This claim has some-
times been made, but rarely in a way that has seemed compelling. Then I review the
best extant work on the topic (Averill and Keating, 1981). Addressing the locality of
conservation requires briefly sketching the history of views about the relations between
minds and space. Then conditionality is studied in more mathematical detail, followed
by locality in more detail. (Readers less interested in the mathematics can skim these
sections.)
I conclude by calling attention to two more serious difficulties, empirical neuro-
science and a novel energy conservation objection from General Relativity (Pitts, 2019).
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The latter does not obviously beg the question in the fashion that the traditional ob-
jection from Leibniz does—though it could have more subtle flaws. These two issues,
not the traditional but unsuccessful Leibnizian objection, should be discussed in the
future.
2 Extant Dualist Responses
Dualists have made a variety of responses to the conservation law objection, some
clearly incorrect, some incorrect but interesting, and some correct but quite incomplete.
The plausibilities ascribed to the various responses within the philosophy of mind
literature has little correlation to their physical plausibilities.
2.1 Incorrect Dualist Responses
One incorrect dualist response to the conservation law objection has been to deny that
any violation of conservation occurs (Broad, 1937, pp. 106-109)(Shaffer, 1968, pp.
66, 67) (Beloff, 2002; Dilley, 2004; Meixner, 2008; Gibb, 2010; White, 2017). Even
oversimplifying the physics, such as by thinking in terms of particles and global con-
servation rather than continua and local conservation, one still runs afoul of Noether’s
first theorem and its converse as applied to time translation invariance (the temporal
uniformity of nature), as will appear below. One also has the less famous but equally
severe problem of momentum conservation (Cornman, 1978). While the conservation
of momentum issue apparently took 40 years to reappear in response to Broad, the
problem in principle should have been clear using the physics of the 1830s, when the
connection between momentum conservation and the homogeneity of space was clearly
stated in relation to variational principles (Hamilton, 1834; Jacobi, 1996) (Marion
and Thornton, 1988), not to mention Leibniz’s invocation of momentum conservation
(Leibniz, 1985, p. 156), which did not require a variational formulation. One sees the
value of talking not about closed systems, but about symmetries (implying conservation
laws) or violated/broken symmetries (not implying conservation laws): it is difficult
to say whether a physical system potentially subject to mental influences is “closed”
(that being a distinction not intended for the philosophy of mind), but it is perfectly
clear that such a physical system lacks the symmetries of time- and space-translation
invariance in the regions of mental influence. Cornman’s attention to contingent details
is not needed; the mere fact (if it is a fact) that my mind acts on my body and not
on Mars implies that mental causation (on the view in question) violates momentum
conservation.
A related incorrect dualist response is teleportation, that is, nonlocal compensation
so that energy that disappears in one place and appears elsewhere (simultaneously?)
(Ducasse, 1960). This answer is a bad idea whether the compensation is thought to hap-
pen simultaneously or at some retarded time (taking into account the speed of light),
because this response neglects the fact that in modern physics, matter is continuous
and conservation laws are local, as will be discussed more below. One reason to insist on
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local conservation is the relativity of simultaneity. That is by no means the only reason,
however. Because modern physics consists of local field theories, conservation laws are
local (Goldstein, 1980, pp. 550, 556) (Griffiths, 1989, p. 4) (Lange, 2002, chapter 5).
Even if perchance relativity someday falls in favor of absolute simultaneity—a possibil-
ity less extravagant after 2009 than one might have thought (Horˇava, 2009) (cited over
1900 times thus far!)—one should still expect local conservation laws, because matter
is continuous and acts locally through the propagation of waves. Because conservation
laws in real physics are local, nonlocal conservation aims to rectify a violation with
what is, in fact, another violation.
Another incorrect response is the idea that the soul might be able to alter the value
of physical constants (even only locally and slightly) (Lowe, 1992). Even if the soul
could do such a thing (which seems even less natural from a physical standpoint than
the mental force discussed below), such a proposal would violate conservation laws just
as badly as would direct mental action on the brain, as will become clearer in light of the
converse first Noether theorem. Spatio-temporally varying ‘constants’ would remove
the time-translation and space-translation symmetries that entail (and are entailed by)
the local conservation of energy and momentum (Cucu and Pitts, 2019).
Another incorrect response is to hold that energy is conserved through dualist inter-
actions because physical energy is converted into mental energy (Hart, 1994). Unless
one is prepared to ascribe mathematical properties to mind, talk of mental energy is a
category mistake or an equivocation between two basically unrelated concepts. If one is
willing to ascribe mathematical properties to the mind itself along the lines of classical
field theory (which seems absurd), then talk of mental energy requires exhibiting the
mathematics defining the canonical energy-momentum tensor (on which more below).
Conservation laws are also invoked as an objection to claimed parapsychological
phenomena, such as the table levitation of certain late 19th-early 20th century medi-
ums. (Griffin provides many references (Griffin, 2000, chapter 7).) Braude, who ac-
cepts such phenomena and reports witnessing a table tilting in graduate school, argues
that such phenomena are compatible with energy conservation due to cold breezes and
changes in the weight of the medium (Braude, 1986; Braude, 1987; Braude et al., 2017).
This proposal has the virtue of addressing both energy and momentum conservation, it
would seem. It may combine several of the above supposed compensation mechanisms.
In any case it is clear that conservation, being not just global but primarily local, and
being related to symmetries by Noether’s first theorem and converse, is too demanding
to be compatible with any such phenomena.
2.2 More Interesting Dualist Responses
Dualists have also made some interesting responses to the conservation law objection,
some of them correct but incomplete, others incorrect but instructive. One interesting
dualist response is the claim that conservation fails but that is no objection because
the law is conditional on the lack of outside influence; let us call this the “condition-
ality” response. Garber and Lowe have offered this response as a reasonable option
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on Descartes’s behalf (Garber, 1983; Lowe, 1992); Rodrigues and Lycan offer it as
an option for dualists (Rodrigues, 2014; Lycan, 2018). Meixner has mentioned con-
ditionality sympathetically without relying upon it because he considers only global
conservation laws (Meixner, 2008). Others have endorsed it, including Knutzen and
Crusius long ago (Watkins, 1998; Watkins, 1995) (influencing the young Kant) and
some more recent authors (Ducasse, 1960; Averill and Keating, 1981; Larmer, 1986;
Plantinga, 2007). This response is correct. It also applies to momentum conservation.
It needs further development, however, which will be given below.
A second interesting dualist response is the claim that conservation laws already
fail in General Relativity even apart from dualism (Mohrhoff, 1997; Collins, 2008;
Collins, 2011).1 If conservation already fails given General Relativity, then plausibly
there is no conservation remaining for dualism to spoil, so the usual objection is elim-
inated. This is an impressive aikido-like move, rhetorically, and shows much better
grasp of the physics than usual. Unfortunately the truth is the reverse: General Rel-
ativity makes Cartesian mental causation harder, not easier (see also (Pitts, 2019)).
One might criticize the Mohrhoff-Collins idea by taking the formal (“pseudotensor”)
conservation laws and gravitational energy in General Relativity seriously, one might
say a realist interpretation (Pitts, 2010). Surprisingly to those outside the field of
General Relativity, it is unusual to take the formal conservation laws and gravitational
energy seriously in General Relativity. The Mohrhoff-Collins proposal takes a widely
shared idea in the General Relativity literature and derives a startling conclusion. In
my experience, mentioning this argument at physics conferences tempts physicists to
apply modus tollens (as I do) rather than modus ponens ; perhaps this is a reason to
take gravitational energy more seriously? The status of gravitational energy and its
conservation is relevant to conserved quantity theories of causation (Fair, 1979; Rueger,
1998; Dowe, 2000; Curiel, 2000). Taking gravitational energy seriously, as I do, would
be an asset for conserved quantity theories of causation; mine is, however, thus far a
minority view.
Fortunately for the issue of mental causation, one can go beyond interpretive stances
and perform uncontentious novel calculations using the generalized Bianchi identities.
In the simplest case, when the nonphysical mental influence is a scalar field (a single
number at each point, the same in all coordinate systems), it follows mathematically
that influence must be spatio-temporally constant. That is absurd for a human (finite)
mind unless the influence is simply zero: there is no influence. Thus General Relativity
makes nonphysical mental causation harder, not easier, a rigorous conclusion that is
entirely independent of interpretive stances about gravitational energy, pseudotensors
and local conservation laws. Realism about gravitational energy has the correct heuris-
tic force, which perhaps counts in favor of the view. But one by no means needs to
sympathize with such realism to accept the mathematical argument. This issue will be
1See also (Penrose, 1994, pp. 334, 344-346) for a related suggestion that this peculiarity of General
Relativity might help to address a conservation-related difficulty of GRW spontaneous collapse theories.
Penrose invokes gravity to induce collapse of the wave function. This project is also linked to the philosophy
of mind.
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discussed elsewhere (Pitts, 2019). This new objection to dualism does not beg the ques-
tion in the fashion that the traditional objection from Leibniz till today does. Whether
the simplest case is representative is another matter.
While common in the philosophy of mind, the traditional (not general relativistic)
argument from conservation against dualism is rarely made by experts in physics even
when they discuss the mind. Thus noted philosopher of physics Jeremy Butterfield
writes:
. . . [A] traditional argument against interactionism is flawed, because of this
false picture of physics.. . . The idea is that any causal interaction between
mind and matter would violate the principle of the conservation of en-
ergy.. . . But, says the argument, physics tells us that energy is conserved
in the sense that the energy of an isolated system is constant, neither in-
creasing nor decreasing.. . . And there is no evidence of such energy gains or
losses in brains. So much the worse, it seems, for interactionism. (Though
traditional, the argument is still current; for example, Dennett endorses it
(1991, pp. 34-35).) This argument is flawed, for two reasons. The first
reason is obvious: who knows how small, or in some other way hard to
measure, these energy gains or losses in brains might be? Agreed, this rea-
son is weak: clearly, the onus is on the interactionist to argue that they
could be small, and indeed are likely to be small. But the second reason
is more interesting, and returns us to the danger of assuming that physics
is cumulative. Namely: the principle of the conservation of energy is not
sacrosanct. . . . [A]lthough no violations have been established hitherto, it
has been seriously questioned on several occasions. It was questioned twice
at the inception of quantum theory. . . . And furthermore, it is not obeyed by
a current proposal . . . for solving quantum theory’s measurement problem.
In short: physicalists need to be wary of bad reasons to think physicalism
is true, arising from naivety about physics. (Butterfield, 1997)
This quotation has several noteworthy features. First, Butterfield does not even
bother to entertain the common “brain-free” argument (which claims that there is a
problem quite apart from looking at the brain), presumably because it is obviously
circular. Rather he moves straight to a more promising a posteriori empirical version:
“there is no evidence of such energy gains or losses in brains.” Part of this paper’s aim
will be to explain what Butterfield understood, that the argument only starts to have
force once one looks at the brain. Second, as also noticed in part by Papineau (Pap-
ineau, 2002, p. 45), philosophers of physics and physicists have a quite different view
of conservation laws from philosophers of mind. Many philosophers of mind regard
conservation laws as categorical results requiring submission from metaphysics and the
philosophy of mind. By contrast Butterfield and physicists know where conservation
laws come from (namely symmetries), naturally think quantitatively (including approx-
imations) rather than thinking of conservation as simply holding or failing, and do not
necessarily find the prospect of small violations frightening. Third, quantum physics
might provide a reason to accept small occasional violations of conservation laws and
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so might be a resource for dualists. Indeed quantum mechanics has been suggested
as ‘leaving more room’ for mental causation by a number of authors including Arthur
Eddington, Eugene Wigner, Henry Margenau, Karl Popper and John Eccles, Henry
Stapp, Roger Penrose, Walter Freeman and Giuseppe Vitiello, Hans Halvorson and
Adrian Kent. (Some of these authors hold that a quantum account has the virtue of
avoiding non-conservation, as opposed to making non-conservation permissible; partly
at issue is how one formulates conservation laws vis-a-vis collapse of the wave function,
if such occurs.)2
However that might be, I will ignore quantum physics, leaving that potential dualist
resource on the table. Clearly quantum mechanics makes matters no worse for the
dualist, whether or not it makes them better. My task will be to make clear what is
known theoretically about conservation laws in the most conservation-friendly realm
of theoretical physics, namely, classical field theory. If quantum field theory is our
ultimate physics, classical field theory is our penultimate physics, the starting point
from which the wonder of quantization is performed by adding the symbols “ˆ ” to
equations to turn functions into operators. When the common objection to dualism
from conservation laws is seen to fail even in its most congenial environment, a fortiori
it fails in quantum field theory. If one wants to give a plausible positive story about
soul-body interaction (if one is possible), certainly quantum physics will be required.
But if one only aspires (as I do) to evaluate the relevance of conservation laws to
the possibility of soul-brain interaction, then one can ignore quantum physics because
classical field theory gives conservation its best shot, and still no interesting objection
arises. Feigl, who played an important role in 20th century philosophy of mind, might
have understood that there was no interesting energy conservation objection. While
discussing another question, he mentions
. . . the conditional: If the law of the conservation of energy holds, then a
perpetuum mobile (of the “first kind”) is thereby logically excluded. But, of
course, the energy law has only empirical validity and might some day be
refuted by cogent empirical evidence. (Feigl, 1958, p. 472).
General Relativity, on the other hand, is a special classical field theory that poses
a novel difficulty for mind-to-body causation, as appeared above, pace claims that
General Relativity provides a new escape from the old difficulty. Thus it could turn
out that quantum considerations matter once one considers General Relativity.
3 The Brain-Free Argument
The conservation of energy is one of the most memorable things that one learns in
secondary school physical science courses such as chemistry and physics. It seems
entirely appropriate that one employ this scientific knowledge when doing metaphysics
and the philosophy of mind. Thus metaphysicians and philosophers of mind, one might
reason, should impose the conservation of energy as a constraint on acceptable views.
2I thank an anonymous referee for clarity on this point.
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Dualism is often suspected of violating the conservation of energy. One can thus appeal
to modus tollens :
1. Dualism implies that energy is not conserved.
2. Energy is conserved. (from Science)
3. Therefore, dualism is false. (by modus tollens)
This is a valid argument with plausible-looking premises. If the argument is sound,
then dualism is false. This type of reasoning seems to be frequent. One might almost
call this attempted reductio “a priori” because no investigation of the brain is required,
though of course premise 2 is not wholly a priori. I will call it a “brain-free” argument.
Ladyman et al. have warned us, however, that not everything aiming to be natu-
ralistic metaphysics (in the sense of respecting science) is altogether successful.
We might thus say that whereas naturalistic metaphysics ought to be a
branch of the philosophy of science, much metaphysics that pays lipservice
to naturalism is really philosophy of A-level chemistry. (Ladyman et al.,
2007, p. 24)
This anti-dualist argument is naturalistic in the sense of opposing spirits, but its nat-
uralistic character in the science-respecting sense is not so evident. Russell said some
time ago that “philosophers . . . are too apt to take their views on science from each
other, not from science.” (Russell, 1913)
Some dualists have accepted premise 2 and denied premise 1 in an attempt to re-
spect science. Unfortunately the opposite is achieved, at least in relation to physics (as
opposed, perhaps, to neuroscience). Premise 1 is true in light of the Noether bicon-
ditional relationship between symmetries and conservation laws, as will appear below.
In the context of a debate on mental causation, premise 2 is question-begging unless
one has found it to be true partly through neuroscience. Without investigation of the
brain, positive instances of energy conservation are (according to the dualist) from a
fatally biased sample. Given the well known collection of non-frivolous a priori argu-
ments for dualism, requiring further evidence for conservation in brains is not like an
unprincipled request for requiring further evidence for conservation in my toothbrush,
or on Vanuatu, or whatever.
Premise 2 is often supposed to be empirically well confirmed. Doubtless a great
many positive instances could be mentioned, many of them involving steam engines;
most of them have nothing to do with contexts where spiritual influence was an-
tecedently plausible to anyone. A logical question arises about the one-sidedness of
the evidence for conservation laws, according to Larmer. “Faced with reports of mir-
acles, the occurrence of which would constitute evidence that energy can be created
or destroyed, it begs the question to dismiss such reports as antecedently improbable
on the grounds that they imply the falsity of the claim that energy can neither be cre-
ated nor destroyed.” (Larmer, 2014) Probably everyone rejects at least some miracle
reports and hence filters the evidence in light of broader considerations; the typical
orthodox Protestant viewpoint denied that miracles have occurred for over 1500 years
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(Warfield, 1918; Craig, 1985). Whether or not one considers it more reasonable to
filter out the remaining miracle reports as well, the fact remains that one is filtering
the evidence in light of larger considerations. Thus the seemingly uncontentious claim
that the conservation of energy is empirically well confirmed (always and everywhere)
hides a worldview-laden conclusion that one has managed to filter out (to one’s own
satisfaction) whatever counter-evidence one has encountered. Evidently, more directly
relevant evidence for energy non-conservation pertaining to brains is even scarcer.
4 Overview of Conservation Laws
This section provides an overview of features of conservation laws in modern physics.
Some of these features require a more detailed discussion, which will be given in later
sections. Lange (Lange, 2002, chapter 5) gives a useful discussion of the conservation of
energy and momentum and their relations to spatial distribution, but this material is
still little known in the philosophy of mind. When the true logical form of conservation
laws is recognized, the failure of both the Leibnizian objection and several dualist
responses becomes evident.
4.1 Locality
First, conservation is fundamentally local : energy conservation holds not primarily for
the whole universe, but in every place separately. Indeed the global conservation law
can fail to make sense in cosmology, if the relevant integrals diverge (Peebles, 1993,
p. 139), whereas the local conservation laws remain meaningful. A few works in the
philosophy of mind (by dualists, as it happens) have noticed that conservation laws
are local (Hart, 1988, p. 64) (Plantinga, 2007). But many dualists have suggested that
energy conservation still holds if the mind affects only the distribution of energy, not
the total amount (Broad, 1937, p. 109)(Dilley, 2004; Meixner, 2008; Gibb, 2010). This
dualist response assumes a (merely) global conservation of energy: for all times t, the
energy E(t) for the whole universe is the same, then one can write merely E. Campbell,
no friend of dualism, generously grants this possibility (Campbell, 1984, chapter 2).
But that is a mistake. Time differentiation gives the more generalizable differential
version
(∀t)
dE
dt
= 0. (1)
But that is not the form that the conservation laws have taken since the late 19th
century, with Hertz’s discovery of “electric waves” (electromagnetic radiation) as pre-
dicted by Maxwell’s theory and with the concomitant propagation of energy at the
speed of light (Poynting, 1884) (not instantaneous action at a distance, though it took
some time to extend the result to gravity). One now understands matter to be con-
tinuous, represented by various mathematical fields, which are functions of time and
space. (If one takes account of quantum mechanics, one gets quantum field theory
(Kaku, 1993; Peskin and Schroeder, 1995), but it has many conceptual and technical
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difficulties (Duncan, 2012).) One can then define the density of energy ρ(t, x) for ev-
ery space-time location (t, x). (In vector calculus, x is the spatial position. Below a
transition will be made to the more expressively adequate component notation.) In
the same way one can define the energy current density J(t, x). The conservation of
energy then takes the form
(∀t)(∀x)
[
∂ρ(t, x)
∂t
+∇ · J(t, x) = 0
]
, (2)
where
∇ · J =
∂Jx
∂x
+
∂Jy
∂y
+
∂Jz
∂z
(3)
is the “divergence” of the current density vector field J (with magnitude and direction
at each point), a measure of how fast energy spews out of the place. The quantification
over spatio-temporal locations is important when one considers negation: just as the
negation of A&B is ¬A∨¬B, so the negation of this universally quantified conservation
law is simply that there exists a space-time location where ∂ρ
∂t
+ ∇ · J 6= 0, i.e., at
which energy is not conserved. Energy might still be conserved almost everywhere and
almost always. Non-conservation might also be small even where it occurs. Everything
said here for energy also applies for momentum in three directions and for angular
momentum in three directions as well. The conservation of mass is of course no longer
a valid conservation law in general, but mass-energy plays its part in the conservation
law for energy.
4.2 Conditionality
Second, whereas many philosophers believe energy conservation to be a categorical re-
sult of physics (e.g., (Fales, 2010, p. 13)), a few authors writing on the philosophy of
mind have rightly asserted that energy conservation in theoretical physics is conditional
upon the absence of external influences (Ducasse, 1960, p. 89)(Averill and Keating,
1981; Larmer, 1986; Plantinga, 2007) (Moreland and Rae, 2000, pp. 107, 108).3 Ex-
ternal influences that vary with time lead to the non-conservation of energy; external
influences varying with location lead to the non-conservation of momentum (Lagrange,
1997; Hamilton, 1834; Jacobi, 1996; Marion and Thornton, 1988; Goldstein, 1980).
Dualism claims that immaterial souls affect bodies; but souls are not (present? and)
active in the same way everywhere and always, so any causal influence from the soul
on the body will vary with time and place, leading to the non-conservation of energy
and momentum where and when they act (and only there and then). If my soul (sup-
posing that I have one) causes my arm to rise, the mental force is exerted on Earth
in the 21st century, not on Mars 100 years ago. Here it is worthwhile to recall the
difference between 17th-18th century Cartesian mechanical philosophy and the vital-
istic doctrines of 18th-19th century Naturphilosophie and Romanticism (for example,
3This answer seems to have been fairly common in 18th century Germany, such as in Knutzen and Crusius
(Watkins, 1995; Watkins, 1998).
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(Strawson, 2008)). The latter insisted that life was different from ordinary matter,
whereas the former claimed that only mind differed fundamentally from matter, while
life was merely a complex mechanical arrangement of matter. While various 19th cen-
tury physiological experiments counted heavily against vitalism, they have little or no
force against a neo-Cartesian view in which souls act on brains; that requires looking
at the brain. That energy is conserved in the stomach and the elbows would be no
surprise to Cartesian mechanical philosophers. Graeco-Roman medicine already ar-
rived at the conclusion of the centrality of the brain to thought (Solmsen, 1961). Lewis
found Jackson’s knowledge argument against materialism powerful, but then offered a
dilemma: either epiphenomenalism is true and the knowledge argument seems absurd
because the qualia make no difference, not even helping to cause utterances about
qualia, or the qualia make a difference and one is betting “against the truth physics”,
which seems “rash” (Lewis, 1999) On the contrary, one is betting against naturalism
and might be betting against neuroscience, and that might be rash, but one is not
betting against physics; physicists might defend Lewis’s claim if they are materialists
but would deny it if they are dualists. Historically Euler comes to mind as a vigorous
proponent of interactionist dualism, critic of Leibniz-Wolff pre-established harmony,
and defender of Christianity (Euler, 1840, parts of Letters 79-115 (Volume I) and of
Letters 1-17 (Volume II)) (Breidert, 2007), not to mention the dominant figure in 18th
century physics, inventing much of continuum mechanics with its local conservation
laws and leaving his name on the Euler-Lagrange equations.4 One might, e.g., take the
view that laws of nature express natural tendencies but fail to specify whether there
exist immaterial substances and what those might cause (von Wachter, 2006).
4.3 Noether Converse: Conservation Implies Symmetry
While the conditional nature of conservation laws is sometimes recognized, there is a
little-known converse theorem that strengthens the point. Noether synthesized and
generalized some extant results (e.g., (Herglotz, 1911; Mie, 1913; Born, 1914; Pitts,
2016)) regarding conservation laws in Lagrangian theories of continua/fields in her
famous first theorem. But she also proved a converse: one can infer from conserva-
tion laws to symmetries (Noether, 1918; Brading, 2001; Brown and Holland, 2004;
Kosmann-Schwarzbach, 2011; Romero-Maltrana, 2015). By contraposition,
Lemma: the violation of symmetries implies the violation of conservation
laws.
Thus it is evident by inspection that the soul’s acting causally on the brain will tend
to violate conservation laws.
Aristotle understood that scientific demonstrations should have premises known
better than and prior to the conclusions (Smith, 2015). The difficulty for the anti-
dualist objector from conservation laws is that, given Noether’s theorem and its con-
4One can see Euler as a forerunner of naturalistic metaphysics in another area, viz. his claim that the
laws of mechanics are so certain that a metaphysics of nature must be answerable to mechanics, not vice
versa (Breidert, 2007) as the more traditional Wolffian claim held (Euler, 1750).
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verse, the distance between premise and conclusion has all but disappeared. Hence the
circularity complaint arises. What formerly looked like an argument against dualism
now looks like a mere incredulous stare: the problem with souls pushing on bodies is
that then souls push on bodies. Of course conservation laws fail, given dualism; that
follows from the converse Noether theorem from conservation laws to symmetries. But
if one finds forceful the sorts of a priori arguments that dualists use (as even some
non-dualists admit (Strawson, 2008; Nagel, 2012)), one ought not to be dissuaded by
an objection that one is thus committed to an immaterial spatio-temporally varying
influence on matter. That is a restatement of the dualist position followed by an
unmotivated appeal to modus tollens, when modus ponens was also available to the
dualist. An appropriate response by a physically informed dualist to the usual energy
conservation objection would be “yeah, so what? Have you looked at the brain closely
enough?” Given that some dualists, trying to respect science, have striven to keep
dualism consistent with conservation laws, Noether’s converse will have force against
those dualist views. But successfully respecting physics requires an adequate under-
standing of the physics, not merely a disposition to submit to what one thinks physics
teaches. Ladyman et al. have distinguished between domesticated and genuine physics
(Ladyman et al., 2007, p. 24). Ironically, those philosophers who are willing to see
conservation fail (Ducasse, 1960, p. 89) (Averill and Keating, 1981; Larmer, 1986;
Plantinga, 2007) (some of whom are religious a priori metaphysicians) have a more
accurate view of the theoretical physics and hence a more naturalistic metaphysics in
one sense. (That is not necessarily the same as a more accurate view of neuroscience,
or of science in general, if there is any such thing). Apparently the “quite standard
physics” of conservation laws is not what it seems from more elementary presentations.
If there is a fatal flaw for dualism in here somewhere, it would be helpful to see an
argument that isn’t obviously circular in light of 20th century physics and that takes
into account the fact that dualism itself is motivated by plausible arguments.
The Noether converse inference from conservation to symmetry excludes an idea
recently proposed.
In short, the dualist might argue that the postulation of non-physical, men-
tal forces is not at all in tension with acceptance of CoE, because the con-
servative nature of the basic physical forces we now know of gives us ample
reason to think that any non-physical, mental forces there are will likewise
obey CoE.
. . . [T]his is, I think, the right thing for the dualist to say. . . . (White, 2017)
White needs an account of the mathematical details of a scheme to preserve conserva-
tion laws without forcing the alleged mental influence on the physical to be the same
everywhere and always, but Noether’s converse first theorem stands in the way.
14
4.4 From Conservation to a Form of Causal Closure; But
So What?
Regarding whether the conservation of energy provides an argument for causal closure
of the physical, Broad and Papineau bear mention. Broad claimed that the conser-
vation of energy was “absolutely irrelevant” in trying to criticize two-way mind-body
interactionism (Broad, 1937, p. 104). Certain physiological experiments indicating
energy conservation in the body were “completely irrelevant” (Broad, 1937, p. 106).
He went on:
Thus the argument from energy has no tendency to disprove Two-sided
Interaction. It has gained a spurious authority from the august name of
the Conservation of Energy. But this impressive principle proves to have
nothing to do with the case. (Broad, 1937, p. 109)
Broad’s grasp of physics (Broad, 1919) was deeper than one might gather from The
Mind and its Place in Nature, though not deep enough in this case. Papineau has a
nuanced discussion which sees the conservation of energy as a contributing factor to the
eventual widespread acceptance of the causal completeness of physics (Papineau, 2000).
Fortunately he places considerable stress on empirical considerations from physiology
(pp. 202, 203).
The converse first Noether theorem (Noether, 1918; Kosmann-Schwarzbach, 2011)
is crucial in this context in two respects. On the one hand, the converse first Noether
theorem says that conservation laws imply symmetries. Symmetries all but imply
causal closure, because any mental forces should vary with time and place, as human
minds obviously do.5 The assumption of the conservation of energy and momentum
at every point in space (local conservation laws) at every moment of time implies (in
the context of classical field theory and the principle of least action) that the laws
of physics are invariant under rigid time- and space translations: the temporal and
spatial uniformity of nature. Hence any mental influence Ψ(t, x, y, z) must be the
same everywhere and always (Ψ = constant). But surely my willing to raise my
arm on Earth in 2018 does not have a uniform influence everywhere and throughout
the whole history and future of the universe. Thus Ψ = 0 is the obvious boundary
condition: the ostensible mental influence disappears, yielding an intuitive version of
causal closure: the mind doesn’t actually have any effect on the world. Energy and
momentum conservation, rightly understood, all but entail an intuitive version of causal
closure and the closure of the gap is obvious. Papineau generously entertains (as a
serious option historically) the possibility of mental forces that respect the conservation
laws (Papineau, 2000; Papineau, 2009). Papineau might well be correct about what
Victorian thinkers generally thought; the wondrous example of Stewart and Tait’s
5One would be hard-pressed to express in scientific language any overdetermination claims to the effect
that the soul only tends to cause events that would have happened anyway, or the like. In the current
philosophy of mind literature, causal closure can mean many things (Montero, 2003) and at least some
dualists manage to affirm at least some versions (Lowe, 2003). Such claims seem like a retreat for the
dualist, however.
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interpreting divine interposition of energy in our world as in fact a transfer of energy
from an unseen realm, with total energy conserved, comes to mind (Stewart and Tait,
1890; Heimann, 1972). But in light of the principle of least action (Born, 1914; Noether,
1918), it should be clear that trying to uphold energy conservation while admitting
mental forces conflicts with the Noether relation between symmetries and conservation
laws. Given the simpler versions of the inference from symmetry to conservation already
available long since in their day (Lagrange, 1997; Hamilton, 1834; Jacobi, 1996), that
isn’t even clearly hindsight.
On the other hand, the assumption of energy (and momentum) conservation—that
is, the assumption of conservation everywhere and always—is a much stronger and more
conjectural claim than one might have thought. For example, the success of energy
(and momentum) conservation in physics and in biology (including the absence of vital
forces) arguably has hardly tendency to undermine Cartesian mental forces; Descartes
himself would have predicted such success. Arguably more relevant is the apparent
(empirical?) progress in reducing the number of plausible exceptions to physical laws
(such as miracles) over the last 500 years. The empirical sword could be double-edged,
however (Broad, 1937, ch. 12). The logic is not luminous, either (Earman, 2000). So
while conservation all but entails causal closure of the physical, conservation is far less
certain that one might have thought, so no decent argument for the causal closure of
the physical results. What the Leibnizian critic of broadly Cartesian views needs is
some reason to think that conservation laws hold even if minds are assumed to act on
bodies, but such reasons are difficult to find without begging the question, at least if
one is not looking at the brain.
4.5 Gentle Failure
Another insufficiently recognized feature of conservation laws is a robustness property
that one might call gentle failure: energy conservation fails gently if it fails at all, so
a modest localized external influence causes no universal catastrophe overthrowing all
science everywhere, pace Bunge. Some authors who appreciate the conditional nature
of conservation laws, by falling silent after asserting the conditionality, seem to suggest
that where conservation does not hold, there is just nothing to say. That silence could
be worrisome. If my soul can create enough energy to tell my brain to make my
finger move, can it create an airplane on a runway? Can I blow up with world with
pure thought? Inductive inference and science generally could be imperiled, much as
Bunge feared. Perhaps physics experiments would be overthrown by energy leaking
in from massive nonconservation in the experimenters’ brains? Fortunately one can
distinguish degrees of nonconservation, not only in sense of the spatio-temporal region
where violation occurs, but also in the magnitude of nonconservation at any given
point. As engineers know, where a conservation law fails due to a source or sink, one
has instead a balance law relating the density and flux of the quantity in question to
that source or sink:
∂ρ
∂t
+∇ · J = source (4)
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(Misner et al., 1973, p. 567) (Mu¨ller and Ruggeri, 1998, pp. 21-26). If the non-
conservation is everywhere and always either zero or sufficiently small (especially if
the places where it is non-zero are rare or relatively inaccessible), there is little threat
to the uses made of and apparent empirical knowledge expressed by conservation laws
(Butterfield, 1997). Thus occasional small failure of the conservation laws would not
threaten chemistry, biology or economics, nor even most of physics.
5 Averill and Keating’s Neglected Work
After this survey of aspects of conservation laws generally neglected in the philosophy of
mind literature, it is appropriate to revisit the best extant work known to me. Averill
and Keating’s treatment (Averill and Keating, 1981) has been the most successful
in interacting with real theoretical physics, drawing upon a standard graduate-level
mechanics textbook, (the first edition of) Herbert Goldstein’s Classical Mechanics,
and often getting things right. It is therefore worthwhile to point out both how much
they got right (much of which is still widely denied) and how much remained to do
beyond their treatment. Commendably, they avoid talk of closed systems in favor of
talk of the presence or absence of external (especially mental) force.
Averill and Keating rightly talk about mental force but not mental energy. Invoca-
tions of mental energy (Hart, 1988; Meixner, 2004; Hart and Yagisawa, 2007; White,
2017) make little contact with the mathematical physics of conservation laws. To ex-
ert a force simply requires coupling to a physical system, but having energy involves
making its own contribution to definition of energy via a term along the lines of ∂L
∂z˙
z˙
for some quantity z; presumably nonphysical minds or mental properties do not do
that. (An analogy might help at least the many who find affinities between dualism
and theism: traditional theists do not regard God as having or transferring energy
(Fales, 2010, p. 26), even if God can impart energy.) Regardless, one should expect
conservation to fail because the laws of physics vary with time and place on account of
the soul’s influence. Thus there is no tension between Averill and Keating’s rejection
of mental energy and their embrace of mental force. An example below will make these
matters more explicit.
Most importantly, Averill and Keating recognize the conditionality of the conser-
vation of momentum and energy and thus point out that since dualism contradicts the
antecedent (no external force), dualism’s contradicting the consequent (the conserva-
tion of energy and momentum) cannot be refuted merely by talking about supposed
but overly strong ‘laws’ of conservation. No true conservation ‘law’ is violated even if
conservation fails.
But much is left undone. Averill and Keating do not frame conservation in terms of
symmetries (energy due to time translation symmetry, momentum due to space trans-
lation symmetry), early 19th century results (if not earlier) extended by Noether in the
1910s. They are (like many experts in physics!) not aware of Noether’s converse re-
sults, results which make all the clearer the question-begging nature of the objection to
interaction from conservation laws because the premise and conclusion nearly coincide.
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Finally, Averill and Keating do not recognize the locality of conservation laws, a topic
discussed by Goldstein in the concluding chapter, which covers continuous systems and
fields.
With this brief mention of various under-recognized features of conservation laws
completed, now a more thorough discussion of a few of these properties is in order.
While gentle failure and the Noether converse seem not to need further discussion, the
conditionality issue, the distinction between mental energy (implausible) and mental
force (less implausible), and the locality of conservation laws need more detailed dis-
cussion. The crucial relevance of General Relativity will be discussed elsewhere (Pitts,
2019).
6 Example; Mental Force without Mental En-
ergy
At this point an example might be useful. One of the simplest examples, and yet
one useful for present purposes, is that of a particle able to move only vertically in a
constant gravitational field, a typical approximation used near the surface of the Earth.
Let z(t) be the height of the particle at time t, z˙(t) be its velocity,m (a constant) be its
mass, and g (a constant) be the acceleration due to gravity. The Lagrangian function
(a.k.a. the “Lagrangian,” the kinetic energy minus the potential energy) is
L =
1
2
mz˙2 −mgz. (5)
The Euler-Lagrange equation is
∂L
∂z
−
d
dt
∂L
∂z˙
= 0 =
−mg −
d
dt
(
1
2
m · 2z˙
)
=
−mg −mz¨ = 0. (6)
This is Newton’s second law in the form F−ma = 0.More relevant for current purposes
is the fact that, in this case, one can read off the violation of momentum conserva-
tion by inspection. The momentum of the particle is ∂L∂z˙ = mz˙. The Euler-Lagrange
equation specifies the rate of change (time derivative) of the momentum ddt
∂L
∂z˙ in terms
of the force −∂L∂z . As daily experience shows, dropped objects do not float in mid-air,
but accelerate toward the ground, acquiring more and more negative momentum in the
vertical direction. Thus momentum is not conserved in this system. (Obviously the mo-
mentum of the Earth and even that of the gravitational field have been ignored.) The
mere explicit dependence of the Lagrangian upon the location (the coordinate z) im-
mediately shows that momentum is not conserved. A translation-invariant Lagrangian
(perhaps of particles interacting by instantaneous Newton gravitational forces) could
depend on the difference of particle positions only.
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What about energy conservation? The energy is given by
E = −L+
∂L
∂z˙
z˙ = −
(
1
2
mz˙2 −mgz
)
+mz˙2 =
1
2
mz˙2 +mgz, (7)
an expression familiar even apart from the Lagrangian apparatus. The rate of change
of energy is
dE
dt
= −
∂L
∂t
− z˙
(
∂L
∂z
−
d
dt
∂L
∂z˙
)
= −
∂L
∂t
(8)
using the Euler-Lagrange equation. But nothing in the Lagrangian L depends explic-
itly on time t (other than the dynamical quantities z and z˙, which are held fixed in
the partial differentiation), so ∂L∂t = 0. One might call that the temporal uniformity
of nature (assumed in this Lagrangian L). Physicists speak of the time translation
invariance of the Lagrangian (and the laws), because resetting the clock by any fixed
amount has no effect on the Lagrangian. The laws of physics are (according to this
Lagrangian) the same at all times. Because the Lagrange function is invariant under
time translations, energy is conserved.
To set up an analogy with immaterial souls or mental properties that act non-
redundantly on the physical world, let us now suppose that g, the acceleration due to
gravity, is allowed to vary, so one has g(t). g didn’t appear in the momentum, but it
did appear in the force, so now the force is time-dependent. Obviously momentum still
isn’t conserved; now the rate of change of momentum isn’t constant, either. For such
a simple Lagrangian, it is easy to calculate dE
dt
. One has
dE
dt
=
d
dt
(
1
2
mz˙2 +mg(t)z
)
=
1
2
m
∂(z˙2)
∂z˙
dz˙
dt
+
∂(mg(t)z)
∂z
dz
dt
+
∂(mg(t)z))
dt
=
mz˙z¨ +mg(t)z˙ +m
dg(t)
dt
z = −z˙(−mg(t)−mz¨) +m
dg(t)
dt
z = 0 +m
dg(t)
dt
z 6= 0 (9)
using the Euler-Lagrange equation at the end. Because g is not a constant, energy is
not conserved. Time translation invariance is violated by the explicit dependence of
g(t) of on t.
The role of g(t) here is a decent toy model of how dualists ought to think of the
soul’s (or causally efficacious mental properties’) action upon matter (or material prop-
erties): it appears in the equations of motion to affect the motion of matter, but only
as an externally applied influence, not as another quantity with its own dynamics
based on the principle of least action and hence its own Euler-Lagrange equation(s).
Thus the soul makes an indirect contribution to the potential energy of the matter,
but it has no mental energy itself (which might involve
(
dg
dt
)2
); mutatis mutandis the
same would hold for mental properties with nonredundant causal influence on matter.
These considerations provide support for the claim that all causation of bodily motion
involves the transfer of energy. One will be hard-pressed (at least apart from quantum
physics) to let the soul affect the body without spoiling energy conservation, because
the soul’s effects on the body are time-dependent if they exist at all, and time trans-
lation symmetry is equivalent to energy conservation (at least for physics satisfying
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the principle of least action). A better toy model would treat matter and the mental
causal influence as spatially continuous, those imposing an external force that varies
with place as well as time. Such a treatment would call for thinking more about how
minds might be related to space.
7 Minds and Space?
From the standpoint of modern local (and presumably relativistic) field theory, a spatio-
temporally varying influence from a non-physical mind is easily accommodated for-
mally. Whether spatio-temporal extension and variation are plausible from the side
of the non-physical mind is another matter, albeit one on which I make no claim to
expertise.
One should distinguish the question of locality (spatial location and variation) from
superficially similar issues in the philosophy of time. As far as classical local field theory
is concerned, it would not be a problem if someone held the view that, say, irreducibly
tensed experience, the nature of language, causation, or some similar considerations
required an objective “flow” of time implying absolute simultaneity (Smith, 1993; Too-
ley, 1997; Craig, 2000; Craig and Smith, 2008). While fundamental physics usually
studies relativistic local field theory, and relativity provides an additional reasons for
field theories to be local, non-relativistic local field theories make sense and are widely
used in condensed matter physics. Local field theory is compatible with absolute simul-
taneity, and such ideas have seen an explosion of attention since 2009 in fundamental
physics as well (Horˇava, 2009). Thus locality can be well motivated even apart from
relativity, though relativity provides reasons to think that mental events are spatially
located (Russell, 1927, p. 384) (Weingard, 1977).
Causal influence from nonphysical minds on the physical world having been widely
assumed in centuries past, one can gain some useful perspective by attempting to
sketch some of that discussion as it addressed the relations of minds to space. As Peter
Menzies writes, “[p]hilosophers from Pierre Gassendi onwards have pointed out such
causal interaction is impossible within Descartes’ metaphysics which awards primacy
to causation by contact forces and in which minds do not have any spatial location or
extension.” (Menzies, 2013) Unlike vague complaints about mysteriousness or souls and
bodies being different and hence causally unrelatable, this complaint about spatiality
vs. nonspatiality and causation only by contact clearly picks out a real problem. Has
physics or dualism (or both) changed so as to ameliorate this problem? Modern physics
is not so much by contact as by spatial overlap (at least as a necessary condition). Fields
being omnipresent (at least regarding where they are defined, though they could have
a value of 0 in some places), the spatial overlap condition is always satisfied. Unlike
mechanical bodies, fields do not exclude each other from a location. But as the concept
of dark matter reminds us, fields do not automatically influence each other. For two
fields to interact directly, each must appear in the other’s equations of motion (a.k.a.
“field equations”). For the non-physical to influence the physical, the non-physical
must appear in the equations of motion for the physical.
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The locality of conservation laws, with many little conservations holding (or not?)
in my brain and many little conservations holding elsewhere, makes it important to
reconsider where souls are, or at any rate where they act, on the assumption that they
exist and act. (The same holds for mental properties that are non-redundantly causally
efficacious.) On this point there is a widespread tendency to take Descartes’s dualism
as normative or at least representative, despite some features that are distinctive and
arguably vulnerable, novel in his day and unpopular among dualists today.
The question of souls’ relationship to space has been discussed, usually negatively.
But it is not clear that the reasons are good (Zimmerman, 2007; Lycan, 2009; Lycan,
2013; Zimmerman, 2010; Bailey et al., 2011; Lycan, 2018). Foster’s inference that
souls lack spatial location from their being wholly non-physical (Foster, 2001) is a
bit quick. A substantial part of the doubt about the possibility of Cartesian mind-
body interaction (not to mention the pairing problem (Kim, 2003)) is due to denying
souls spatial location (Wong, 2007). According to Jaegwon Kim, “It can be seen
that Descartes’s trouble with mental causation has nothing to do with the bruteness
or primitiveness of causation or whether causation is merely a matter of Humean
regularity, and that it has everything to do with the supposed nonspatiality of Cartesian
minds.” (Kim, 2007, p. 76)
At least some scholastics had a doctrine that the whole of a soul was present in every
part of the space that it occupied (Grant, 1981, p. 223). This idea doesn’t seem terribly
clear, and was criticized by Henry More, who made spirits more straightforwardly
spatial (Grant, 1981, p. 223). The views of the scholastics on angels and space were
complex, diverse and dynamic (Iribarren and Lenz, 2007; Cross, 2012), and might
be relevant to understanding the tradition of views about human souls’ relations to
space (though there was little tendency to think of humans as akin to angels + bodies,
as Malebranche perhaps did (Connell, 1967)). As a crude summary, one might say
that angels were held to be neither fully in space nor fully out of it, with questions
about whether presence was merely causal, or substantial (a view generally rejected),
or in some other fashion. One might also consider the intelligences who used to drive
the planets around (until they were fired due to Copernicanism, the rise of inertia
in physics, and the mechanical philosophy (McKaughan and Vande Wall, 2018, pp.
252, 283, 565)). Rather than being occasional messengers from a divine realm, these
intelligences had full-time jobs relating them to particular places in the physical world.
In the early modern period, pace Descartes, some authors such as More and Samuel
Clarke did take immaterial souls to be spatially located and to occupy a finite rather
than point volume (Vailati, 1993; Zimmerman, 2007). (Recently doubt has been ex-
pressed whether Cartesians really held the views now commonly ascribed to them (Reid,
2008).) While More’s and Clarke’s spatially extended souls differ from the scholastic
view, all these authors (would have) rejected Descartes’s non-spatial soul interacting
with matter at one point in favor of a soul in some fashion related to a region of space
(Vailati, 1993). Locke ascribed location and mobility to souls, and ascribing finite
spatial extent seems to be quite compatible with his views (Brown, 2012).
Spatially located souls also address a concern of Lowe’s, who worried that various
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interactionist theories “seem to be inherently incapable of explaining why the mind’s
causal influence upon the material world has to be channelled through the brain: none
of them can readily explain why telekinesis is not a ubiquitous phenomenon.” (Lowe,
1992) Finite spatial extent also facilitates Eccles’s spatio-temporal patterning of the
mind (Eccles, 1987). Hasker’s non-Cartesian emergent souls are also spatially located
(Hasker, 2001). While such views seem to break with dualist tradition, perhaps our
view of tradition is faulty. “For even if philosophers today very often take for granted
that immaterial entities have no location, this is in fact quite an extraordinary view,
historically speaking.” (Pasnau, 2011, p. 328)
It is a familiar feature of modern physics (Green’s functions, Dirac delta functions,
etc. (Jackson, 1975)) that if something acts at only one point, achieving a finite effect
requires that the act be an infinite spike. This is, perhaps, another reason why dualists
should not want to follow Descartes’s point-sized area of the soul’s influence: the soul
would have to hit the brain too hard in one area. That would be hard on that part of
the brain.
8 Conditionality, II
Locality was discussed before conditionality in the preview above, because locality
seems easier to describe verbally than does conditionality. However, if one brings in
the mathematics of local conservation laws, one might as well include conditionality
as well. Thus it makes sense to introduce the mathematics of conditionality in the
simplest case with global conservation laws, and only later introduce local (conditional)
conservation laws.
Elementary treatments of conservation laws often talk about conservation laws as
holding for “closed systems,” a custom widely followed in the philosophy of mind
literature (e.g., (Montero, 2006; Koksvik, 2007)). Unfortunately it is not terribly clear
what it is for a system to be “closed” if one is contemplating immaterial influences.
Is an immaterial soul that acts only on the brain, “in” the brain? Must one address
the relationship between souls and space? This ambiguity has a simple remedy: drop
the talk of closed systems, which rarely appears in advanced physics, and talk instead
about symmetries such as time translation invariance and space translation invariance
(a.k.a. the homogeneity of space), the uniformity of nature. Thus what counts is where
a soul acts, not where it is (if it is anywhere).
The conservation of energy and other conserved quantities can be investigated in
a simple yet systematic way for classical (that is, not quantum) theories, whether of
particles or fields, if the dynamics of the system can be derived from the principle of
least action. The action S is defined as the time integral of the Lagrangian L. For
mechanical systems, the Lagrangian is typically the kinetic energy T less the potential
energy U :
L =def T − U. (10)
While Lagrangian dynamics cannot describe every conceivable physical behavior (such
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as dissipation or quantum behavior), it is the general starting point for fundamental
physical theories in contemporary physics. Energy conservation finds its greatest pos-
sible warrant in Lagrangian dynamics, so we will meet the objection to dualism in its
strongest form while working within Lagrangian dynamics. If the objection fails in a
Lagrangian context, then it fails, period.
Conservation can be studied at various levels of mathematical sophistication. Texts
on quantum field theory typically address classical field theory in the early chapters.
Thus they often begin with Noether’s first theorem, which systematically illuminates
the relationship between symmetries (rigid transformations of the description that
make no real difference) and conservation laws (Noether, 1918; Kaku, 1993). This level
of mathematical complexity is not necessary for present purposes, however—though
Noether’s emphasis on converses to her theorems will be recalled below. Conservation
laws in General Relativity, a rather distinctive classical field theory, present still further
complexities and perplexities (Anderson, 1967), though the latter may be ameliorated
somewhat (Pitts, 2010).
For now I will recall the advanced undergraduate mechanics derivations of the global
conservation of energy and momentum for a collection of particles (e.g., (Marion and
Thornton, 1988)). Angular momentum could be treated in much the same way as mo-
mentum. The conservation of energy follows if and (basically) only if the Lagrangian
lacks explicit dependence on time. The Lagrangian usually depends on time implicitly
through dependence on position and/or velocity while still conserving energy, but ex-
plicit dependence on time (except of a certain trivial sort) will exclude the conservation
of energy. Thus the conservation of energy follows as a conditional claim (actually a
biconditional one), not a categorical one.
Let us now consider the mathematics. Assume that there areN particles indexed by
the labelK, which runs from 1 toN , and that these exhaust the physical contents of the
world. The Kth particle has coordinates xiK and the velocity components v
i
K =df
dxi
K
dt ;
i runs from 1 to 3 because there are (presumably) three spatial dimensions. (This index
is more convenient than calling the three coordinates x, y and z. It also extends nicely
into relativistic physics. When relativity and space-time are in view, it is customary to
use a superscript rather than a subscript as the index for coordinates, hence xi rather
than xi.) The energy function involves summing over all the N particles and over all
of their three spatial coordinates:
E = −L+
N∑
K=1
3∑
i=1
∂L
∂viK
viK . (11)
The conservation of energy would be just the vanishing (being 0) at all times of the total
time derivative dE
dt
. The total time derivative includes both explicit time dependence,
which would arise from an external influence, in this case including any immaterial
entities acting on the N particles (which will appear in the term ∂L
∂t
, the partial deriva-
tive with respect to t when the velocities viK and coordinates x
i
K are held constant),
and implicit time dependence through the positions and velocities of the N bodies.
As will appear, explicit time dependence will spoil conservation. (In the interest of
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compactness, quantifiers over time will be suppressed for a while.)
dE
dt
=
d
dt
(
−L +
N∑
K=1
3∑
i=1
∂L
∂viK
viK
)
=
−
∂L
∂t
−
N∑
K=1
3∑
i=1
viK
(
∂L
∂xiK
−
d
dt
∂L
∂viK
)
. (12)
The expressions ∂L
∂xi
K
− ddt
∂L
∂vi
K
are just the Euler-Lagrange derivatives of the Lagrangian.
The Euler-Lagrange equations of motion assert that these derivatives are 0: for each
particle K and coordinates i,
∂L
∂xiK
−
d
dt
∂L
∂viK
= 0. (13)
These equations of motion are equivalent to Newton’s laws when Newtonian and La-
grangian formulations both apply. The Euler-Lagrange equations look like Newton’s
laws in terms of the momenta piK =
∂L
∂vi
K
in simple cases, such as if the Newtonian
force is just the (negative of the) derivative of the potential energy and the coordinates
are Cartesian:
∂L
∂xiK
−
d
dt
∂L
∂viK
=
∂(T − U)
∂xiK
−
d
dt
piK =
∂(−U)
∂xiK
−
d
dt
piK = 0. (14)
This is basically Newton’s second law for the Kth particle in the form F −ma = 0.
If one adds these equations for all particles, the total momentum is conserved if and
only if the position of the center of mass does not enter the Lagrangian. Then the
Lagrangian is independent of the position of the system as a whole, depending only on
the relative coordinates such as xi
1
−xi
2
. The Lagrangian is translation-invariant; space
is homogeneous. That the conservation of momentum follows from the invariance of
the Lagrangian under spatial translations was understood by Hamiltonian and Jacobi
in the 1830s (Hamilton, 1834; Jacobi, 1996). But it was not generally accepted that
physics should use a variational principle until perhaps the 1920s. (Some sources on the
history of the relationship between symmetries and conservation laws exist (Houtappel
et al., 1965; Kastrup, 1987; Kosmann-Schwarzbach, 2011; Pitts, 2016).)
The conservation of angular momentum follows from a similar argument. If the
Lagrangian is invariant under a rotation of all the particles together, then space is
isotropic. Isotropy underlies the conservation of angular momentum much as invariance
under time translation underlies the conservation of energy and spatial homogeneity
underlies the conservation of momentum. Momentum conservation and perhaps an-
gular momentum conservation could constitute objections to dualism in the same way
that energy conservation does.
Returning to question of the conservation of energy, one sees that, using the Euler-
Lagrange equations, energy is conserved if and (more or less) only if the Lagrangian
does not depend explicitly on time:
dE
dt
= −
∂L
∂t
−
N∑
K=1
3∑
i=1
viK
(
∂L
∂xiK
−
d
dt
∂L
∂viK
)
= −
∂L
∂t
(15)
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for solutions of the equations of motion. If ∂L
∂t
6= 0 (and if one cannot remove this
dependence by adding a total time derivative to the Lagrangian, an addition which has
no effect on the Euler-Lagrange equations of motion), then at least some of the particles
experience a time-dependent influence. Then energy conservation fails. Assuming
∂L
∂t = 0 (the manifest form of the time-translation invariance of the Lagrangian and
the physical laws), then one has energy conservation:
(∀t)
(
dE
dt
= 0
)
, (16)
a result known already to Lagrange over two centuries ago (Lagrange, 1997). Now the
universal quantifier over time t is explicit, partly to pump intuitions about what the
failure of conservation would mean logically in terms of de Morgan’s law ¬(A&B) ↔
(¬A ∨ ¬B) and its quantifier analog, partly to help to prepare for the treatment of
continuous matter below, in which time and space are treated more symmetrically. All
the equations above were tacitly universally quantified over all times.
9 Locality, II
Consider N fields φK(t, x, y, z), real functions of position and time, and let K be an
index that runs from 1 to N . The fields can include vector fields as in electromag-
netism and the weak and strong nuclear forces, tensor fields as in the case of gravity,
spinor fields for electrons, etc., by treating each component as a field (and taking real
and imaginary parts or the like for complex fields); this derivation aims to be math-
ematically simple and capacious. Whereas in the previous derivation, time was the
independent variable on which the positions and hence the velocities depended, now
the time and space are the independent variables on which the fields φK and their time
and space derivatives ∂φK
∂t
and ∂φK
∂xi
depend.
Conservation laws for continuous matter/fields, using the principle of least action,
are derived from a Lagrangian L defined as the spatial volume integral of the La-
grangian density L :
L =
∫
all space
d3xL =
∫
∞
−∞
dx
∫
∞
−∞
dy
∫
∞
−∞
dz L. (17)
The Lagrangian density L is a function of φK(t, x
i), their time and space derivatives
∂φK
∂t
(t, xi) and ∂φK
∂xi
(t, xi) and maybe time t and place xi. In the early 1910s Max Born
expressed how rigid translation symmetries imply conservation laws:
The assumption of Mie just emphasized, that the function [L] is independent
of x, y, z, t, is also the real mathematical reason for the validity of the
momentum-energy-law. . . .We assert that for these differential equations,
a law, analogous to the energy law (3′) of Lagrangian mechanics, is always
valid as soon as one of the 4 coordinates xα does not appear explicitly in
[L]. (Born, 1914)
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The relevant mathematics is well understood and available in many graduate-level
textbooks (e.g., (Goldstein, 1980, chapter 12) (Davis, 1970)). Readers not interested
in the mathematics are welcome to skip the equations that lack explicit quantifiers.
The previous section already illuminated the logical status of conservation laws as
conditional claims using the simplest adequate mathematics: a world with N particles,
possibly subject to external (immaterial) influences. Now let us see how the same issues
arise with the further feature that conservation laws are primarily local rather than
global. This effort will require multi-variable rather than single-variable differential
calculus, to discuss how a quantity dependent upon several others changes when one of
the independent variables changes and the others remain the same. Local conservation
laws state that for each small region of space, the amount of energy (or momentum,
angular momentum, or the like) changes over time only because some of the conserved
quantity flows out through the boundaries of the region; more mathematically, the
density ρ of the conserved quantity and its current density J i satisfy
(∀t)(∀x)(∀y)(∀z)
(
∂ρ(t, x, y, z)
∂t
+
3∑
k=1
∂J i(t, x, y, z)
∂xi
= 0
)
. (18)
One can group time and space together using Greek indices running from 0 (time)
to 3): xι = 〈t, xi〉. (Using coordinates with an index is advantageous over bold-faced
vector notation, because the former but not the latter also naturally works for General
Relativity.) The Euler-Lagrange field equations follow from the Lagrangian density
L(φK ,
∂φK
∂xι , x
ι). The explicit dependence on xι permitted here leaves room for influence
from immaterial substances to avoid begging the question against dualism. For brevity
I will write partial derivatives ∂φK∂xι as φK ,ι and the like. If we write ρ as J
0, then the
continuity equation for conservation is
(∀t)(∀x)(∀y)(∀z)
(
∂ρ
∂t
+
3∑
k=1
∂J i
∂xi
= 0
)
= (∀t)(∀x)(∀y)(∀z)
(
3∑
ι=0
∂J ι
∂xι
= 0
)
=
(∀t)(∀x)(∀y)(∀z)
(
3∑
ι=0
J ι,ι= 0
)
. (19)
This kind of equation holds for each quantity that is locally conserved, such as en-
ergy, momentum and angular momentum are if the appropriate symmetries hold. The
continuity equation expresses a local conservation law.
For the conservation of energy and momentum (if in fact they are conserved),
one gets a total of four continuity equations at each space-time point. The canonical
energy-momentum “tensor” (which can fail to be a tensor in some cases, such as General
Relativity (Anderson, 1967; Wald, 1984; Pitts, 2010)) is
T ιν = −Lδ
ι
ν +
N∑
K=1
∂L
∂φK ,ι
φK ,ν , (20)
where διν , the “Kronecker δ”, is 1 if ι = ν and 0 otherwise. If desired, one can break
up this equation into the energy and momentum pieces. Setting ν = 0, one gets the
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expression for energy:
T ι
0
= −Lδι
0
+
N∑
K=1
∂L
∂φK ,ι
φK ,0 ; (21)
thus the first term is present for the energy density T 0
0
but vanishes for the energy flux
T i
0
. Setting ν = n (n = 1 to 3), one gets the expression for momentum:
T ιn = −Lδ
ι
n +
N∑
K=1
∂L
∂φK ,ι
φK ,n ; (22)
thus the first term vanishes for the momentum density T 0n but is present for the diagonal
components (i = n, pressure) of the momentum flux T in.
Returning now to the 4-dimensional expressions for streamlining, we can now as-
certain the circumstances under which energy and momentum are locally conserved by
taking the total four-divergence of the canonical energy-momentum tensor, including
both explicit dependence on xι (which could include the influence of immaterial enti-
ties) and implicit dependence on the space-time location through the field φK and its
spatio-temporal partial derivatives:
3∑
ι=0
d
dxι
T ιν =
3∑
ι=0
d
dxι
(
−Lδιν +
N∑
K=1
∂L
∂φK ,ι
φK ,ν
)
=
−
∂L
∂xν
−
N∑
K=1
φK ,ν
(
∂L
∂φK
−
3∑
ι=0
d
dxι
∂L
∂φK,ι
)
. (23)
The expression in parentheses is the Euler-Lagrange derivative of the Lagrangian den-
sity for the Kth field φK ; the field equations just assert that this quantity vanishes (for
each field and each space-time point),
∂L
∂φK
−
3∑
ι=0
d
dxι
∂L
∂φK ,ι
= 0. (24)
Using the field equations, one therefore has
(∀t)(∀x)(∀y)(∀z)
(
3∑
ι=0
d
dxι
T ιν = −
∂L
∂xν
)
. (25)
For ν = 0 this is just the local conservation of energy (if the right side is 0 at the
place (t, x, y, z) in question); for ν = 1, 2, 3 it is the local conservation of momentum
(again, if the right side is 0 there and then). Locality and conditionality together have
the consequence that wherever and whenever no immaterial influence acts on matter,
then energy and momentum are conserved. If the right side − ∂L
∂xν
is nonzero in some
parts of space-time, then energy and/or momentum fails to be conserved in those parts.
For present purposes, the most plausible parts would be those times and places where
brains of living persons are.
The canonical energy-momentum ‘tensor’ defined above arguably has certain vices,
such as not being symmetric in many cases (symmetry being useful to define angular
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momentum) and depending on arbitrary choices (gauge-dependence) in electromag-
netism. These can be fixed by Belinfante’s symmetrization procedure and are irrel-
evant for present purposes. There are additional conceptual problems in relation to
General Relativity, some of which make it a distinctive theory requiring special treat-
ment. The above is a no-frills treatment of the core ideas needed for present purposes,
foregrounding the relationship between symmetry and conservation with the simplest
adequate mathematics.
One can relativize conservation laws and our warrant for accepting them to places.
Even some of the best work (Papineau, 2000) speaks of conservation of energy in the
singular, as though there were just one bit of accounting to do, rather than uncount-
ably infinitely many. If there is a singular conservation of energy to talk about, it is
presumably either a global law, or a vast conjunction of all the local conservations.
The former is obtained by integrating (adding up) all the local conservation laws and
is logically too weak; the subterfuge of nonlocal compensation exploits this weakness.
Global conservation laws, moreover, can fail to make mathematical sense if the matter
of the universe doesn’t think out fast enough at large distances (Peebles, 1993, p. 139).
The other singular entity that one might envisage for the conservation of energy is a
conjunction of all the local conservation laws. However, its warrant is only as great as
that of its weakest link. If the question of energy conservation in the brain is being
discussed, then our warrant for this conjunctive conservation law is no better than our
warrant for conservation in the brain (assuming that to be the weakest link).
10 Not Begging the Question: Neuroscience?
Given experiences testing the conservation of energy in secondary school or in uni-
versity science laboratories, one might think that it is straightforward to ascertain
empirically whether energy is conserved. But at least in fundamental physics it is dif-
ficult to test conservation laws directly. That is because the mathematical expression
for energy density and energy flux density (and likewise for momentum and for angular
momentum) is highly theory-dependent. It also involves performing a spatial integral
of an expression (typically) quadratic in first derivatives of the physical fields—which
is extremely different from sticking a thermometer into a beaker (though thermometers
themselves are striking theory-rich achievements (Chang, 2007)). It is more reasonable
simply to test (empirically) whether the theory’s equations of motion hold and (the-
oretically) whether the theory is time translation-invariant. While sufficiently gross
violations wouldn’t require the mathematics to discern—such as if an aircraft carrier
suddenly appeared in a wheat field in Kansas ex nihilo, or even levitation (controver-
sially ascribed to 19th century medium Daniel D. Home and 17th century (St.) Joseph
of Copertino (Dingwall, 1947; Braude, 1986; Grosso, 2016), though Braude thinks that
conservation still holds, as noted above)—there seem not to be such cases pertaining to
the philosophy of mind. Admittedly a microscopic field description of the brain might
be unnecessary; some macroscopic description might suffice. But such a description will
involve detailed consideration of the structure and function of the brain: neuroscience.
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What kind of evidence is required to count against dualism? Wade Savage claimed
against Eccles (Eccles, 1976) that it was unnecessary to look at the brain to reject
dualism, even though the extant empirical evidence didn’t rule dualism out and per-
haps evidence never would (Savage, 1976); the “mysterious and inexplicable” nature of
immaterial mental influence on the physical sufficed. A contrary view is that looking at
the brain is clearly the most relevant kind of evidence and there has not been enough
of it to dismiss dualism (Foster, 1989; Meixner, 2005; Koksvik, 2006; Thompson, 2008;
Garcia, 2014; White, 2017). Many neuroscientists would disagree that there has not
been enough evidence from the brain. Perhaps larger world-view issues of intellectual
history, not just detailed micro-argumentation characteristic of analytic philosophy,
play a crucial role in such judgments (Evans, 1981; Sturgeon, 1998) (Burge, 2007, p.
360). The rapidity with which words like “ghosts,” “spooks” and “superstition” are
deployed and the ease with which dualism is dismissed with what Lycan calls weak ar-
guments (Lycan, 2009) suggest that many feel that it should not be necessary to argue
about such matters nowadays. Coherence between dualism and theism has also been
suggested by people on both sides of the theistic-nontheistic divide (Bunge, 1980; Tal-
iaferro, 1994; McGinn, 1999; Foster, 2001; Meixner, 2004; Plantinga, 2007). Whether
or not it is too early to dismiss dualism given the evidence — a difficult question if
Bayesian priors are subjective — evidence from the brain (past or future) is especially
relevant. Precious little such evidence was available to Leibniz, for example. Fortu-
nately some detailed empirical investigation of such matters in fact has been occurring
(Wilson, 1977; Wilson, 1993; Wilson, 1995; Wilson, 1999; McDermott, 2001; Clarke,
2009; Clarke, 2014). Here is an example (Wilson, 1999):
If mind is not a part of the physical universe but is able to influence brain
events, then violations of physical laws should occur at points of such mental
influence. Using current knowledge of how the nervous system functions, the
minimal necessary magnitude of such violations is examined.. . . A variety of
influences that could produce action potentials is considered, including the
direct opening of sodium channels in membranes, the triggering of release
of neurotransmitter at synapses, the opening of postsynaptic, ligand-gated
channels, and the control of neuromodulation. It is shown that the mag-
nitude of the disturbance required is significantly greater than allowed for
under quantum-mechanical uncertainty. It is concluded that violations of
fundamental physical laws, such as energy conservation, would occur were
a non-physical mind able to influence brain and behaviour.
This is a refreshingly detailed critique, though one might worry that the Leibnizian en-
ergy conservation objection is sneaking back in (which is fair for Wilson’s purpose but
not for ours). Peter Clarke’s work also exemplified the right sort of critique (Clarke,
2009; Clarke, 2014; Clarke, 2010a; Clarke, 2010b). According to Clarke, a neuroscien-
tist (now deceased) and evidently a Christian but a dual-aspect monist,
[m]odern substance dualist philosophers continue to argue that their views
are compatible with neuroscience, and I think that part of the reason is
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that they pay careful attention only to neuropsychology, largely ignoring
the strong mechanistic implications of the other branches of neuroscience.
When evidence from the whole breadth of neuroscience is taken together,
it constitutes a truly formidable challenge to substance dualism. . . . In my
opinion the only kind of substance dualism that is still even remotely de-
fendable in the light of modern neuroscience is a limited one, invoking a
separate soul acting on the brain only for very particular aspects of our
humanity such as free will (e.g. the philosopher Robert Kane).. . . (Clarke,
2009)
In contrast to the question-begging brain-free argument considered above, Clarke criti-
cizes dualism for a right kind of reason. Papineau also stresses empirical considerations
from neuroscience (Papineau, 2000, pp. 202, 203). I suggest that those looking to crit-
icize dualism for reasons that ought to be persuasive (rather than question-begging)
look to neuroscience, where, apparently according to most experts, such reasons will
be found.
11 Conclusion
To sum up, the energy conservation objection generally discussed from the 17th to
the 21st centuries, being question-begging, has little to recommend it, even without
drawing upon quantum mechanics (which might yield further loopholes). At best the
objection provides a way to frame an incredulous stare more articulately while sounding
pro-science. When one opens the black box of conservation laws, one finds a mirror
reflecting back one’s own beliefs. Some of the traditional responses by dualists are
perhaps even less impressive, betraying lack of awareness of what conservation laws
say and where they come from. However, the (bi)conditionality response is deeply
rooted in the most relevant physics, Noether’s first theorem and its converse, and had
an important role in the original 18th century debate as well.
Two related challenges to dualism are more worth attention, namely, the a posteriori
empirical question from neuroscience and the novel difficulty posed by General Rela-
tivity (Pitts, 2019); the latter might intersect in interesting ways with larger worldview
considerations.
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